Me presento, soy Vash y soy IF

Yo más bien diria que el 80% de las empresas no se consiguen simular a futuro con la suficiente seguridad.
Y luego tienes otro 19% que las simulas y no te parece que esten atractivas.

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Último esfuerzo (ya no enmierdo más): expongo una tontería de cálculo, que para muchos será conocido, pero aportará a otros. Conocer esta bobada ayuda mucho a saber por dónde moverte… aunque no deja de ser una mirada por el retrovisor (lo importante es la mirada de lo que va a venir).

Para valorar una empresa mirando el retrovisor se pueden usar muchos ratios. El más conocido por lo simple es el PER pero tiene muchos defectos (muy manipulable y no contempla la deuda), a los más entendidos les gusta el EV/FCF por ser menos manipulable y que incluye la deuda… pero es algo más complejo de sacar. Otros usan el EV/EBITDA por ser relativamente simple y también menos manipulable que el PER.

Trato de poner dos ratios simples que ayudan a comparar empresas del mismo sector (varían de sector a sector): el ratio EV/EBITDA y el ratio Deuda Neta/EBITDA. No vale para empresas financieras, ni REITS, pero sí para muchas de las habituales de las que gustan por aquí (industriales, consumo, farmas, químicas, materias primas, etc).

Capitalización = Número de acciones x precio de la acción
Es lo que teóricamente cuesta comprar toda la empresa y tener por tanto todos sus derechos y obligaciones (deudas incluidas).

Deuda Neta = Deuda financiera (la que se tiene con los bancos que pide intereses) – Caja (dinero en efectivo o convertible fácilmente en efectivo)
Ambas cosas se sacan del balance… mejor el del último trimestre.

EV = Enterprise Value = Valor de la empresa = capitalización + deuda neta
Es lo que realmente cuesta comprar toda la empresa incluyendo la deuda. Para que se entienda, cuando el Santander compró por 1€ al Popular, no pagó sólo ese euro… asumió toda su enorme deuda y algo tendría en caja para compensar. Imaginando que tuviese 6.000 millones de deuda y 1.000 millones en caja, el resultado es que lo compraría por un EV = 1€ + 6.0000m€ - 1.000m€ = 5.000m€ (desprecio el 1€).

EBIT = Resultado de Explotación = Ventas – Costes de las Ventas y generales – Depreciación y amortización = Beneficio antes de meter los costes financieros e impuestos.
Se saca de la cuenta de resultados anual. Hay que tratar de descontar el efecto de extraordinarios tanto positivos como negativos (efectos “one-shot” en la cuenta de resultados que no vayan a ser recurrentes).

EBITDA = EBIT + depreciación + amortización = lo mismo pero sin descontar la depreciación y amortización
El sitio más fiable para sacar la depreciación y amortización es la cuenta de flujos de caja.

Ratio EV/EBITDA => mide lo que cuesta la empresa con la deuda financiera incluída frente a su capacidad de generar ingresos operativos.

Ratio y Deuda Neta /EBITDA => mide el tamaño de la deuda neta frente a su capacidad de generar ingresos operativos.

Pongo dos aplicaciones muy prácticas de estos ratios:

1.- Comparar empresas del mismo sector en un momento concreto: animaría a comparar ABBOTT, TEVA y NOVARTIS. ¿Qué se puede apreciar de la comparativa?. ¿Qué parece llamativo en cada caso?. Luego está el tipo de productos que tiene cada uno, los márgenes de cada línea, etc… pero hacer este ejercicio tan simple ya te da cierta idea. ¿Os animáis a hacerlo?

2.- Comparar la evolución histórica de una empresa en el tiempo: animaría a coger las principales posiciones en cartera y calcular estos dos ratios que incluyen la deuda para los últimos 10 años (no para financieras o REITS). Hacerlo dará una información clara sobre si una acción estable (las habituales de por aquí) tiene un precio alto, bajo o razonable. Ayuda a saber si hoy Coca Cola está cara o no (otra cosa es porqué está cara o porqué está barata).

Espero que aporte.

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No sé qué le parecerá a Vash pero benditos enmierdes los que usted hace.
Gracias.

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Ooooooole! A mi sí me impresiona :smile:

Muchas gracias además por compartir vuestro conocimiento y vuestros pensamientos @vash y @alvaromusach. Creo que los sabéis leer bien a las empresas, los que entendéis más de sus fundamentales, de sus fortalezas y de sus debilidades tenéis más posibilidades de acertar en vuestras compras.

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Que bueno :grin::grin::grin:

Muchas gracias por el update en la cartera y las explicaciones @vash. Yo veo ahí un proceso inversor bien sólido, desarrollado y optimizado a lo largo del tiempo. Y todas las posiciones tienen un hilo conductor bien claro y un objetivo definido.

Una pregunta, veo que en Euros solamente llevas REE y ENG, vamos, un 15% de la cartera. Es decir el nivel de dividendos anual puede tener cierta incertidumbre o una alta dependencia si hay movimientos bruscos de la divisa, ¿no te preocupa eso o no buscas incluir algo más en €?

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Conozco esos ratios, de hecho la pagina de Seeking Alpha te los da e incluso en los escaneres de IbBrokers puedes ordenar las empresas por un monton de Fundamentales, no hace falta hacer los calculos.
Teva, entre parentesis el sector
EV/EBITDA (TTM) 8.40 (16.40) Abbot 22.90 Nova 14.60
EV/EBITDA (FWD) 8.08 (14.74) Abbot 20.12 Nova 15.48

Para mi, tanto Abbot como Novartis son compra, sin duda, pero a su precio. Ahora mismo ambas estan en maximos.

Lo que dice, es mirar al pasado y en el peor momento de una. Y estas es imposible saber todas las lineas de investigacion y productos que tienen en la recamara.
En Teva sigue la idea de fusionarla con Mylan, el apoyo de su gobierno…

Podemos echar todas las cuentas sobre los estados que presenta una empresa, pero al final hay tantos ponderables como imponderables.

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Si claro, cuando encuentre esto :wink::

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Yo creo que sí hace falta hacer las cuentas, sólo así eliminas extraordinarios y te empapas algo más de las empresas. Y creo que es tan importante el ratio que pones como el que no pones de deuda/ebitda

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Si, se que Teva tiene mucha mas deuda que las otras dos.
Los datos: Teva 12.4 Nov 2.01 Abbot 3.06 datos este Q.
Y hablamos de dos monstruos que capitalizan muuuuuucho mas que ella. Pero en el caso de Teva creo que hablamos de una buena empresa en su peor momento.

Y por mi compraría 1000 de cada una :grin: pero claro, entre las que cotizan a 90$ y me van a dar un 2% a una que cotiza a 9$ con una “expectativa razonable” de revertir a la media…
Mi cartera solo da para Teva jajajajaja

Ademas, viví lo de 2016 y 2017, incluso en esta ultima tanda de subida tuve calls (habia vendido puts antes) que me dieron bastante dinero (e incluso casi me pillan en la subida).
Y he estado mirando pero las ultimas que tenia a 17 para 2019 las deshice cuando toco los 20$ que ya la veía de nuevo sobrevalorada (y sin sacar nada nuevo que subiera el bº).
Asi que la he sufrido varios años, ahora fuera lios por debajo de 10$ para mi vale algo… si las ventas de esos dos que deposita mucho de su futuro suben volvera rapido a 20$ (si los jaleos extra empresariales la dejan).

Perdon tambien a @vash por “enmendar” como dice D.Alvaro… pero si asi le tiro de la lengua lo doy por bienvenido (fui lector en la sombra de cierto blog muuuucho tiempo).

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This is the worst run for oil stocks vs the market in at least the last ~50 years

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¿Alguien entiende por qué los datos de dividend growth de Seeking Alpha difieren tanto de los que se pueden consultar en la lista CCC?

Por ejemplo

DOV en CCC:
DGR 3-yr 5.0%
DGR 5-yr 9.4%
DGR 10-yr 9.7%

DOV en SA:

:rofl::rofl::rofl: y bien orgulloso que estoy :rofl::rofl::rofl:

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Pues si añadimos Sure Dividend, ya ni te cuento :rofl::rofl:

Según esa gráfica de SA Dover pago 1.8094$ de dividendos en el 2018 y la realidad es que pagó 1.90$ (0.47+0.47+0.48+0.48). Aquí hay truco del almendruco

Curiosidades cinematograficas:

25 Years Ago Today, Forrest Gump Debuts.

In the film, his Bubba Gump shrimp money is put into Apple.

Based on the timeline, Gump could’ve bought 3% of the company for about $100,000.

Today that’s worth $28.1 billion, which would make him the 31st richest in the world today.

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Un 3% de la compañía por 100K implica un market cap de Apple en ese fecha de poco más de 3 millones de USD. Comprando empresas del SP500 o del FTSE100 no vamos a pegar un pelotazo así jamás.
Ni siquiera yendo a algunos índices de small caps llegamos a esas capitalizaciones tan bajas.

The most widely recognized definitions of small-, large- and mid-cap stocks are probably those used by Standard & Poor’s . Its large-cap index, the S&P 500, appears daily on the front page of newspaper business sections and the home page of financial websites. To be included in the S&P 500, a company must have a market cap of at least $8.2 billion . At the small-cap end of the scale, Standard & Poor’s offers the S&P SmallCap 600.

To be included, a company must have a market cap of $300 million to $1.4 billion. And in the middle is the S&P MidCap 400. Companies in this index must have a market cap of $1.4 billion to $5.9 billion. Notice that S&P’s mid-cap range overlaps both the high end of the small-cap range and the low end of the large-cap range. Stock classification systems invariably include overlap.

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Seessel, Adam. Barron’s (Online); New York (Jul 9, 2019).

When I was a junior analyst at Sanford Bernstein nearly 25 years ago, our betters drummed into our heads that everything in the investment world went back to normal and that John Templeton was right when he said that the four most expensive words in the English language were “this time it’s different.” Bernstein had a sophisticated computer model that we referred to as the black box; its job was to tell us worker bees the most statistically cheap sectors every month. Like good worker bees, we would more or less automatically buy the stocks in those sectors and sell stocks in the most expensive sectors. The black box minted money for the firm and its clients for decades, precisely because everything did eventually return to normal. Cheap auto stocks appreciated to fair value, expensive tech stocks returned to average, and the investing world was good—safe and predictable. It was indeed dangerous to think “this time it’s different.”

Today, however, five of the world’s six largest companies by market value are tech companies. Most of them weren’t even born when Bernstein laid down its law. As for returning to normal, does anyone really believe that is going to happen, for example, to Amazon.com or Alphabet? E-commerce and digital advertising still have only a small share of their global market, despite nearly a generation of growth. Other industries—ride-sharing,onlinelending, and renewable energy—are smaller still, but also show every sign of being long-term winners. How are these sectors going to somehow revert to the mean? Conversely, how will legacy sectors that lose share to these disruptors return to their normal growth trajectory?

Digital, wireless, and other disruptive technologies are changing our economy in ways that nobody fully understands, but one thing is increasingly clear: Old-economy sectors like retail and financials are cheap not for short-term, cyclical reasons—they are cheap for long-term, secular ones. As a result, exchange-traded-fund investors should think twice before buying sectors that look statistically cheap, but are exposed to secular risk. When rebalancing portfolios, it often will be a mistake to trim the expensive sectors to buy the cheap ones. And even if an investor decides to overweight industries on the right side of history, caveat emptor: Some ETFs in growth sectors have considerably more exposure to legacy firms than others.

I am a bottom-up stockpicker, but from my days at Bernstein I understand and sympathize with those who make sector bets. Consider this a warning from your stock-picking cousin who’s spent time exploring the frontier of the early 21st century economy. Things look very different than they did 25 or even 10 years ago. Sector bets must be placed accordingly.

Retail’s challenges in the face of Amazon are well-known, but many other, less obvious sectors are at risk, as well. The energy industry, especially large, legacy fossil-fuel companies, faces multiple headwinds in the form of shale technologies, wind, and solar energy rapidly coming down the cost curve—and, of course, there’s vehicle electrification. Autos themselves have many challenges: Bloombeg Businessweek recently ran a cover story on “peak car,” calling the automobile “the killer transportation app of the 20th century.” Even sectors that many investors consider rock solid are showing signs of cracks. Legacy financials are still well loved by value investors, but financial-technology companies have gone from accounting for a zero percent share of U.S. personal loans to nearly 40% in a decade. They were born online, have slick mobile interfaces, are customer-friendly, and have much less bureaucracy than legacy banks. Quicken Loans now ranks among the nation’s largest mortgage lenders; it says you can get a Quicken mortgage two to three times faster than from a legacy bank.

From both a top-down or a bottom-up perspective, it’s easy to see that the investment implications are profound. David Giroux, a portfolio manager for T. Rowe Price and the firm’s chief investment officer of U.S. Equity and Multi-Asset, puts each company in the S&P 500 through what he calls a secular-risk analysis four times a year. When he started the process five years ago, he and his team found that companies representing 20% of the S&P’s market capitalization faced threats from sea changes in the economy. Today, Giroux estimates, that figure is more than 30%. In a few years, he says, it could be 40% to 50%.

“When I was an associate analyst in 1998, I covered digital-imaging stocks like Xerox and Kodak, and those certainly had their challenges,” Giroux says. “But the overall disruption in the economy was not large, even when I became a portfolio manager in 2006. Since then, however, more and more companies have got caught up in secular challenges—and that trend is not abating; it’s getting stronger.”

Giroux is applying this research as the stock-picking manager of the T Rowe Price Capital Appreciation fund (ticker: PRWCX) with impressive results: Since 2006, it has delivered 108% of the market’s return after fees, despite running a balanced strategy averaging only 60% to 65% equity exposure. But his secular-risk analysis contains important information for ETF investors. One obvious implication is that ETF investors should overweight sectors that are going to be secular gainers and underweight those that are falling behind. In 1990, the information-technology sector was roughly 6% of the S&P’s market value as defined by the Global Industry Classification Standard; today, it’s 21%. Aerospace and Defense, a subgroup of GICS’ industrial sector, also has tailwinds: The number of miles flown by commercial aircraft has grown at roughly twice the rate of worldwide gross domestic product over the past 50 years, yet 80% of the world’s population has still not set foot in an airplane.

This same binary, growing-or-dying mind-set should apply when rebalancing sector allocations. Sectors that appear cheap, but are secularly disadvantaged, will get cheaper. Telecom is a good example. In the early 1990s, it was nearly 10% of the S&P’s market cap and bigger than the IT sector. Thanks to serial technological disruptions, however, what was once the nation’s communications backbone represented a mere 2% of the S&P’s market value last year. Telecom has become such a small part of the U.S. economy’s value that, last fall, S&P and MSCI, which jointly own the GICS classification system, abolished telecom as one of 11 major sectors.

Finally, and perhaps least obviously, even if you decide to invest in secular growth sectors, it is not a good idea to blindly buy an ETF just because its name sounds like it will provide the exposure you want. Consider the ETF industry’s two biggest tech funds: Because they chose to include different underlying sectors at inception, they have had widely divergent long-term performance. Morningstar data show that a $1 million investment in the Vanguard Information Technology Index fund (VGT) would have returned an investor $5.59 million over the past 15 years—but that same $1 million in the Technology Select Sector SPDR ETF (XLK) would have returned $5.04 million, or $550,000 less. That’s a shocking gap, largely attributable to a decision made by the SPDR’s creator, State Street Global Advisors. When it created the security back in the late 1990s, State Street included the ill-fated telecom sector. Vanguard based its ETF on only the GICS IT sector—the same sector that grew from 6% to 21% of the S&P’s market cap over the past generation.

This discrepancy has been remedied; with the abolishment of the telecom sector last year, State Street now relies solely on the GICS IT sector, as does Vanguard.

For many years, the person in charge of Bernstein’s black box was CEO Lew Sanders. Sanders left the firm a decade ago and started his own shop, Sanders Capital, which now runs more than $25 billion, mostly in global equities. A year or two ago, I looked up Sanders Capital’s largest holdings. I was beginning to believe that reversion to the mean was largely defunct as an investment construct, and I suppose I wanted to check myself against the keeper of the mean-reversion flame.

Four of Sanders’ five largest positions were tech companies. These included Alphabet (GOOG) and Microsoft (MSFT), and they remain in his top five today. Both trade for mid-to-high 20s multiples of earnings, and, as such, they are definitely not statistically cheap. On the other hand, neither shows any sign of reversion to the mean. Digital advertising currently represents well under half of total worldwide marketing spend. Cloud computing currently handles only 10% to 15% of the daily IT workload. This time really does seem different.

Adam Seessel is the founder and CEO of Gravity Capital Management in New York. Gravity had a position in Alphabet when this article was published.

Email: editors@barrons.com

Credit: By Adam Seessel

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Ajustados a la inflación desde hace 25 años esto queda en:
$8.2 billones americanos ===>$3.27 billones americanos
$5.9 billones americanos ===>$2.35 billones americanos
$1.4 billones americanos ===>$557 millones
$300 millones ===>$119.5 millones

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Resumen: esta vez es diferente. :thinking:

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y resumiendo en español…

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