Ted SeeksQuality

"You talk about growth rates, about P/E ratios, and about what is or is not an appropriate price to pay for a given stock. In this environment I am seeing several problems with that approach.

(1) I have very little earnings visibility for 2020-2021 and low confidence in my long-term estimates. It seems to me like we will see major structural changes in the economy over the next few years, and I’m not smart enough to know how they will all play out.

(2) One of the many possibilities on the table is a Great Depression. This wouldn’t necessarily be caused by the virus? I believe the economy has been vulnerable for a while. (How this plays out depends in part on our politicians, on the President and on Congress, and they may have wildly different ideas on how to proceed.) If this brief Recession extends into a Depression, a simple 2% earnings growth could be “best of class”. I know that I’m not expecting better than that for most of my portfolio this year.

(3) One of the key elements in the political response is massive fiscal stimulus (the COVID checks) and monetary stimulus (from the Fed opening the firehose). Over the course of barely a month, the Fed book has increased by $2T, literally 50%!!! That money has to go somewhere? If it gets spent on goods and services, then the economy will recover but we will see rampant inflation. If it gets invested, then asset prices will be forced higher – and the markets may reset to a higher “new normal” P/E, just as they did in the last QE.

Thus I see valuation in this market as an exercise in navigating through dense fog, in stormy seas, based on charts that are a decade old. Perhaps we can do so skillfully and avoid the shoals? But I’m placing my greater faith in the strength of my ship."


Consejo a alguien que cedió al pánico y vendió en el peor momento.
También comenta los movimientos que ha hecho estos meses.

""Set it up to auto-reinvest, and auto-rebalance, and don’t look at it. "

DON’T LOOK AT IT!!! I know that some here think that I’m an “active” investor, and must be obsessing over every market movement in an attempt to profit, but for the most part I’m just letting this wash past me. I’m checking in every couple weeks to make new (small) purchase recommendations to those I advise who are continuing to invest money. But I’m not worrying about gains, losses, analyst cuts, or whatever. I’m not even worrying about dividend cuts – there will be some but the magnitude will be manageable.

My “big moves” the last couple months have been to initiate positions in ADP and SYK. My allocations told me it was time to add to the portfolio, and these are two great companies I’ve wanted to own for a while. I don’t recall my purchase prices, though I’ll look them up if you ask. I don’t have any clue what their earnings will look like this year. But I’m quite confident that I will be happy with the investments ten years down the road.

My other moves? Sold OTIS and CARR spinoffs. I have no clue whether they are a great value or not, but their credit quality does not fit my criteria. Easy decision regardless of whether they go up or down. Trimmed from ITW and ETN, and added some more shares of RTX (now that I can buy that one as a standalone). Trimmed from MSFT (the position was getting huge) and added to TXN.

None of this involved guessing the direction of the markets – all just trying to “right size” my positions in great companies that I want to own.
“I should note that I’m glad to be a “Total Return” investor. If I were exclusively focused on dividends, then I’d be far more concerned with the possibility of dividend cuts than I am. As a Total Return investor, I find it easy to look past the short-term turmoil to see the long-term value in these companies.”


Acerca de Disney.

“I’m taking a hard look at Disney, not necessarily because of the chatter here or because of the dividend cut, but…
(1) Near-term earnings are somewhere in between “bad” and “non-existent”.
(2) Long-term picture is uncertain. I am not convinced we are “back to normal” on June 1. Nor necessarily even in 2-3 years. We may find a “new normal” in which certain Disney operations are permanently impaired.
(3) Love the content and the business, but we’re paying a pretty high multiple for that future given the combination of headwinds and poor visibility.
Haven’t sold yet. Not sure what I would buy if I did sell. But am thinking it makes sense to sell in some of the more conservative portfolios I advise. It isn’t quite as speculative as NFLX, but the investment premise is similar.”


Y dos días después vende su posición (y también en otras carteras que lleva).
Como en todo, hay opiniones dispares. Gente del hilo DGI de S.A. han vendido y otros aguantan.

Sold the final shares of DIS, used the proceeds (and a few hundred dollars of cash) to add to RTX and NSRGY. Received $352 in dividends last year. Expect $624 of dividends over the next 12 months, which is $624 more than I would have expected from continuing to hold DIS.
Obviously it is easy to improve your dividends over a company that has suspended theirs. In this case it is “trading up” from a company that never paid much of a dividend to companies that pay above-average dividends, and at an exchange ratio that is pretty flat. Thus our dividend income improves YOY.
It is debatable which of the three companies will see the greatest growth over the next five years. I don’t love the idea of investing in a growth thesis in the face of strong headwinds. DIS will survive and thrive, but that doesn’t mean they will be immune to this in the near term.
I will keep watch on DIS and consider rebuilding the position if the price/economy improves. Lifetime gains on DIS and associated options amounting to an 11.5% CAGR over the last five years, which isn’t outstanding but is better than a stick in the eye.”


Yo también vendí DIS a mediados de abril, aprovechando el rebote.

La razón de la venta no fue la más que probable suspensión del dividendo (mi YOC era de alrededor del 2%, era un dividendo bastante bajo y esa no era razon suficiente para mí, algunas de mis acciones no pagan dividendo alguno).

La razón de la venta fue la incertidumbre sobre el potencial de negocio futuro. A pesar de que DIS es el epítome de empresa con un pedazo de MOAT invencible y partiendo de la base de que el negocio de Streaming tiene tanto o más potencial que el de NFLX, ahora mismo hay muchas incógnitas sobre el valor de los negocios de Parques, hoteles, cruceros y producciones cinematográficas .

Incluso si mañana desaparece el virus para siempre, no sabemos cómo se va a comportar el consumidor a partir de ahora en términos de patrones de gasto y de ahorro (razón entre algunas otras por la que pienso que la salida de la crisis no va a ser en V como están anticipando el Nasdaq y el SP500 y que nos queda más caida, pienso que habrá oportunidades de coger DIS y muchas otras a mejores precios)


Creo que nos queda una larga travesia en el desierto.

Quieren ir muy deprisa con la economia para que no colapse pero no se yo si el consumidor va a ir a la misma velocidad que quieren las empresas y los gobiernos.

Inseguridad, incertidumbre, posible rebrote, segunda oleada, etc.

Creo que hasta que no haya una vacuna las cosas van a estar un poco en el aire


"Out of curiosity, I pulled our top 20 positions from 8/3/2018 to compare to our current holdings.



Divested from DIS (COVID risk, valuation), IBM (YPMO, quality), VFC (valuation at peak).

Added GOOG, HD, ADP, SYK, MRK, UNH. Others were/are owned in both periods even if no longer quite in the top 20."


" we just executed a major set of trades – our largest since March. Added to JNJ, MRK, MSFT, PG. At least two of the four are overpriced by any normal definition, yet still priced fairly vs. peers. All four are quality companies that I expect to be there and supporting me in 10-20 years.

We are in a grossly inflated market. The Fed has created a ridiculous amount of new money in the last six months, and that money has to flow SOMEWHERE. Most of it has flowed to the bond and stock markets, though some may be flowing to real estate as well.

So what am I going to do? Sit on cash forever? When we have cash available, we put it to work, according to our allocation plan. Next year we will have more cash available (and the allocation plan always calls for a substantial cash position). I’m not going to spend my life fearing the next correction, jumping in and out of the market in the hopes of dodging the “big one”.

I don’t want to tell people that the market ISN’T overpriced, but at the same time I’m not going to let that drive me. Focus on the long term, practicing consistent portfolio management when the market is high as well as when it is low. Those who are fearful of valuations now will often be fearful for other reasons when the market is low. I’ll work to choose my best CURRENT options in either case, regardless of how the market behaves."


" As a DGI investor, are you better off when the market rises or falls? (Keeping in mind that you have no control over which happens.) Consider a hypothetical stock that costs $100 in Year 0, has $6 of EPS, a 6.5% earnings growth rate, and a 50% payout ratio. Those are the fundamentals that I will use throughout.
(1) If the share price sits at $100 for ten years, while you continue reinvesting dividends, an initial investment of $10,000 will have grown to just $14,868, but the annual income will have increased from $300 to $837. You can think of this as the AT&T scenario, perhaps? In this scenario the earnings and dividends rise over time, but the share price stagnates.
(2) Yet that is a somewhat unusual situation – rising earnings and rising dividends SHOULD be accompanied by rising share prices over longer periods of time. (Albeit ten years isn’t an especially long period of time.) If the yield were to remain constant, then the portfolio value would increase to $25,227 but the income would only increase to $757.Which do you prefer? Despite DGI investors claiming not to care about the share price and portfolio value, my guess is that most people here would prefer the latter scenario. While it might result in 10% less portfolio income, it is hard to pass up an extra $10k in value that could be harvested through trimming. Either situation works out pretty well!
The concerning scenarios are those in which the share price outpaces the fundamentals. Chowder writes about how all value lies in the future, but if that value is recognized too quickly by the market, it can lead to an extended period of under-performance.
(3) Suppose the share price rises immediately after purchase to the “future value” implied by a 3.0% yield on the earnings 10 years from now – and then stays there for ten years? The initial purchase might have been fairly valued. The ending purchase might be fairly valued. But the compounding from the reinvestment is much less effective – the portfolio ends with $23,234 of value, but the income is just $697 in this scenario. A premature increase in the market is clearly inferior to the “steady state” scenario described in (2).
(4) Of course the ugliest scenario is when you purchase at an inflated value and the share price stagnates. Even if the fundamental earnings and dividend growth is strong, and even if the price never falls, the compounding is MUCH less effective when buying at a premium price. If that initial purchase is at $187 (based on a 16.7 P/E for the earnings ten years down the road), then the $10k investment grows to just $12,378 and the final income is just $371. No capital gains, just ten years of accumulated and compounded dividends, but compounding from a low yield doesn’t take you very far.
(5) I’m sure some will point out that scenario (4) assumes a ten year retrenchment from a 31.3 P/E to a 16.7 P/E. Wouldn’t things still work out pretty well if the valuation stays high? Running this scenario definitely results in a higher terminal portfolio value of $21,995 (though that is still inferior to scenarios 2 and 3), but the terminal income in this situation is just $351, a ten-year YOC of just 3.5%!!!
If you buy at a “fair value”, pretty much any scenario works out well! If the share price stagnates, your compounding catches fire and you end up with a terrific terminal income – in fact the best of any of these scenarios! If the share price tracks with earnings, you get almost as much income and a heck of a lot of gains to boot. Even if the share price rises prematurely, short-cutting the compounding, you still end up with strong numbers.
But if you buy at a 30+ P/E, the magic of compounding doesn’t get you nearly as far. Call this the HRL scenario? A current P/E around 30, an initial dividend yield of 1.6%, and steady (but unspectacular) earnings growth anticipated? Maybe CLX or MKC?Again, I want to emphasize that the FUNDAMENTALS of the company are identical in each scenario. Steady earnings growth and dividend growth. Clearly a company that merits a very high dividend safety score.
That’s why I hate this market… The good news is that the bulk of our purchases were made years ago, at much more reasonable valuations. The bad news is that the share price appears to be anticipating the next 5-10 years of gains, which limits my ability to compound income growth through reinvestment. I don’t know whether the valuations will correct over time (scenario 4) or find a “new normal” at this level (scenario 5), but neither is all that attractive for an income investor.
And heck, I’m not even a True DGI!"


En respuesta a la pregunta: ¿Entonces empresas que se mantienen con precios bajos mientras se hace reinversión de dividendos (DRIP) funcionarán bien para DGI?.
Las empresas son XOM, T, CVX, MO y PM.texto en negrita

“The three primary factors controlling your future income stream:
(1) Initial yield
(2) Organic dividend growth
(3) Quality – dividend cuts do awful things to dividend income
You are buying those five at excellent yields (XOM, MO, T, CVX, PM). I’m assuming they don’t presently have much dividend growth (I know T does not), but with yields like that you don’t NEED much dividend growth. As long as their Quality remains high, and they avoid dividend cuts, those investments should play out for you.
Note that it takes a LONG time for a 1.6% dividend yield to catch up to a 4.0% dividend yield, even if the former increases 10% annually while the latter increases at a low-single-digit rate. Thus the initial yield (i.e. valuation) matters more to future income than the dividend growth rate does. (Quality is paramount, here as always.)
From a capital gains perspective, you might look at it differently:
(1) The initial valuation (think “yield” or P./E or something similar)
(2) The terminal valuation
(3) Organic growth (dividend growth and/or earnings growth)
(4) Quality!!!
If your initial valuation is lower than your terminal valuation (e.g. buy at a 12 P/E and sell at an 18 P/E, think GIS) you get large gains even if the earnings have increased only modestly. In the reverse scenario, it takes a heck of a lot of organic growth to make up for a retrenchment from a 50 P/E to a 20 P/E (think WMT post-bubble).
And Quality overrides all else. If the business deteriorates and earnings fall, you won’t be seeing any capital gains.”


"Alentaría a la gente a tener una visión a largo plazo con la inversión de dividendos. Si una empresa es financieramente sólida, uno o dos años de crecimiento más lento no deberían ser un gran problema; en la mayoría de los casos, el “dinero muerto” desaparece en el espejo retrovisor una vez que la empresa alcanza su siguiente racha de crecimiento.

¿Se da cuenta de que las ganancias de NKE se mantuvieron estables de 2017 a 2019? ¡Ahora, de repente, están viendo $ 3.40 / acción durante el próximo año con un crecimiento excepcional proyectado a partir de eso! A finales de 2017, la gente miraba un precio de acción que no había ido a ninguna parte durante dos años, un modelo de negocio que estaba en declive, costos crecientes y EPS plano … Un par de años después son los favoritos de la calle.
Wall Street tiene una capacidad de atención muy corta. Se centran en gran medida en las ganancias del último trimestre y las perspectivas para el próximo año. Los ciclos económicos son más largos que esto: le tomó a NKE un par de años construir el canal DTC que está impulsando su éxito actual.
Y si una empresa de crecimiento agresivo como NKE puede estancarse durante un par de años, considera las implicaciones para las empresas de crecimiento más lento como JNJ, MMM y CSCO. Las ganancias de JNJ bajaron un poco en 2020, y el precio de las acciones estuvo estancado en un canal desde mediados de 2017 hasta mediados de 2020. ¿Ahora? Se ha salido de ese canal a lo grande. MMM cometió algunos pasos en falso, que junto con los ciclos económicos generaron un período de CUATRO años de ganancias planas, pero parece estar nuevamente en la senda del crecimiento nuevamente. CSCO se encuentra en medio de un período de crecimiento más lento, el final aún no está a la vista, pero no veo ninguna razón para creer que finalmente no saldrán de él.
Las comparaciones de CSCO con IBM son un poco prematuras. IBM vio disminuir el EPS de 2013 a 2016, luego se estancó durante dos años y luego disminuyó MUCHO durante los próximos dos años. Por el contrario, las ganancias de CSCO simplemente se han estancado. Existe una gran diferencia entre un crecimiento lento y un crecimiento negativo, ¡especialmente para las empresas cargadas de deudas!"


" “Cuanto más grande es una empresa, más tarda en dar la vuelta. Tengo paciencia”.

El otro factor clave es la fuerza. No puede identificar un núcleo rentable si todas tus marcas son débiles. No puedes darte el lujo de invertir en nuevos sistemas si tienes un gran apalancamiento y tienes dificultades para cumplir con los dividendos.
Las empresas fuertes eventualmente lo resolverán. Las empresas más débiles pueden verse atrapadas en un ciclo de tala y quema, hasta que no quede mucho. Considera el caso de IBM, que ha perdido un tercio de sus ingresos, un tercio de su beneficio bruto y la mitad de su beneficio operativo durante la última década, y está a punto de escindir otra fracción sustancial. Todo mientras que los pasivos se han AUMENTADO en un 30%, porque necesitaban recomprar acciones al papel debido a la caída de EPS.
Las empresas crecen, se expanden, se escinden, se contraen … Es un ciclo sin fin. Los fuertes manejan este ciclo con éxito, mientras que los débiles buscan una solución rápida."


Quarterly portfolio summary:
JNJ - 6.6% (ought to help drive performance over next five years)
AAPL - 4.7% (can’t sell any without nasty tax consequences)
MSFT - 4.2% (and still a decent value)
ADP - 3.1%
NKE - 3.0%
2.9% to 2.5%: HD, HON, UNP, MMM, UL, RTX, CSCO
1.9% to 1.5%: LMT, AMGN, MRK, INTC, NEE, SO, DUK, HRL, PEP, BDX
1.4% to 1.0%: D, ED, TXN, WEC, JPM, PFE
0.9% down: V, CHD, GS (likely to build V and CHD slowly, likely to ditch GS)
Kind of wondering how I ended up with THIS much ADP, but not complaining. Was a pandemic purchase a year ago. The huge rally pushes my expectations for forward returns down, though. At this time I am expecting five-year returns under 3% for: NEE, TXN, SO, CHD, D, AAPL, ADP, WEC, NSRGY, HON, V, and BRK.B. My method for these numbers is pretty superficial, and tends to underrate both utilities and faster-growth companies, but ValueLine’s numbers average out just 2.8% for this group. So I really shouldn’t be expecting this quarter of my portfolio to beat inflation.
But does that matter? The overall portfolio generates a 2.0% yield with a reasonable expectation of 8% earnings growth, and even at inflated valuations will likely return 6.5% annually over the next 3-5 years. Matching ValueLine’s estimates to a tee. I could improve the numbers on my spreadsheet by selling out of those “overvalued” stocks, but in doing so I would sap a lot of strength from the portfolio. I may trim here and there, but wholesale changes are not in the plan. Not when it would involve selling long-term winners like you see on that list.


I definitely tend to trade more than most here… What is driving this activity? I thought I would look back at my sales so far this year:

Jan 11 – sold WTRG. Quality downgrades paired with high valuation made it a poor fit for my portfolio. I like the idea of owning a water utility, but I need to find one with stronger quality metrics.

Jan 21 – reduced GOOG, concurrently with adding FB. Now have large positions in both rather than a double-max position in GOOG.

Mar 10 – sold GWW. Good company, but I never really warmed to it. It wasn’t a large position, so if I wasn’t going to build it further then selling made sense.

Mar 12 – sold SYY. Combination of increasing debt, weak dividend safety, and high valuation with arguably diminished forward prospects. I really like the company and their management, but the pandemic closures damaged them and it will take time to repair the capital structure.

Mar 23 – sold T on a downgrade from SSD. It was marginal quality to begin with, and the downgrade pushed it over the edge.

April 9 – trimmed GOOG slightly due to position size.

April 12 – trimmed SYK. Was working on expanding the breadth of my healthcare/devices holdings.

April 14 – sold GS. I really don’t like the company. I’ll blame a bad influence for causing me to purchase it in the first place.

April 16 – sold ORCL. Bought it a month earlier on valuation, dumped the entire position on the rebound. I believe other tech companies are better positioned long term.

April 19 – trimmed ADP, HD. Fully valued and exceeding position limits.

April 21 – sold SO. Marginal quality, fully valued.

May 7 – trimmed CVS. Position limits.

June 1 – sold HD to add a full position in LOW. No room to hold both at that size.

June 3 – sold OGN. Not interested in owning that spinoff (or most spinoffs).

Reasons for selling:
Quality concerns: WTRG, SYY, T, SOAdding a similar company: GOOG, HD, SYKPosition sizes: GOOG, ADP, HD, CVS
Bad fit for me: GWW, GS, OGN
Valuation trade: ORCL

I did reference valuation as a secondary consideration in multiple trades. When a marginal stock or a large position is substantially undervalued (e.g. CVS or T), then I struggle with greed and can be slow to sell. But when I believe it is more or less fully valued (not necessarily overvalued), then it is easier for me to move on and improve the quality or balance of the portfolio.

The only one which was really driven by valuation was ORCL. I bought it primarily because it was selling at a 30% discount. I sold it when that discount had narrowed to 15%, for a 20% gain. But I might have sold it anyways, even if the share price hadn’t responded? It is one of those “good enough” companies that pass the metrics but don’t inspire me with their quality and outlook.

Note that I revised my investment plan in early April, adopting an income-focused approach while also adjusting the way I treat my IRA balances (I had previously discounted them by 25% to account for taxes). These changes messed with some of my allocations, leading to some of the moves later that month.

The only transaction with tax consequences was (part of) the sale of SYY on March 12. All other transactions were in IRAs. I generally do not sell in our taxable account unless there are quality concerns, so the turnover there is low.


Muy interesante (y larga) conversación acerca de la reinversión y del cálculo del DGR (dividend-growth-rate) ya que no es la suma dividido por el número de empresas.

"Consider, for example, a portfolio with three equal-weighted positions. Call them WPC, PEP, and NKE. (A real portfolio will have more than three positions, but that merely complicates the calculations. It doesn’t really change the mathematics.)

WPC has a 5.43% yield and (according to SSD) 1.0% dividend growth in the last year. PEP has a 2.82% yield and 5.1% dividend growth. NKE has a 0.68% yield and 12.0% dividend growth. If I average these numbers, I get a 2.98% yield and 6.03% dividend growth. Right?

Unfortunately it doesn’t work that way. In an equal-weighted portfolio, yield averages. If I had $10k invested in each at that yield, then I’m anticipating $543 of dividends from WPC, $282 from PEP, $68 from NKE, for a total of $893. A 2.98% yield on the $30k portfolio. But the impact of the dividend growth isn’t weighted by the size of the position, but by the contribution to the income stream! Applying those growth factors for one year, my next year’s dividend income might be $548, $296, and $76 respectively, for a total of $921. Just 3.1% dividend growth!!!

Another way to look at it? That 1% DGR for WPC added $5.43 of income. That 12% DGR for NKE added $8.16 of income. PEP added $14.38, more than both of the others combined! (Sweet spot of moderate yield and moderate growth.)

Again, this isn’t specifically about those three companies or about the numbers I pulled from SSD. Doesn’t make a difference whether the numbers are right or wrong, and I’m not trying to tell anybody what they should own. But the fundamental mathematical point is that the dividend growth rate of the higher yield securities counts more heavily (is weighted on more dollars) than the dividend growth rate of the lower yield securities.

My take on this?

Lower-yield companies with high DGR don’t really do much to increase your portfolio income. Not directly at least, unless they are held in MUCH larger size than the other positions. However, high-growth companies will also tend to deliver strong capital appreciation over time. This helps to support my strategy of trimming a portion of this growth to build other positions that aren’t growing much on their own. And once I came to that conclusion, there was little reason for me to care about the DGR of these companies or even whether they paid a dividend at all. AAPL, MSFT, NKE, FB, and GOOG all serve an essentially identical role in my portfolio. AMZN as well, once it is built in size.

Which brings to mind another mathematical conclusion – the boost to dividend income from reinvesting dividends depends solely on the yield of the shares being purchased with those dividends. If I’m reinvesting NKE dividends into NKE, then I get a 0.7% boost to my DGR from that reinvestment. If I reinvest them into WPC, then I get a 5.4% boost to the DGR. Thus selective reinvestment of dividends into the higher-yield securities can generate greater DGR than the yield of the portfolio might suggest.

Again, these conclusions are basic mathematics. Simple stuff that is entirely agnostic to your investment approach and your goals. Do with it what you will.

(1) Higher-yield securities weight more heavily in “organic” dividend growth than lower-yield securities, leading to a lower portfolio DGR than an “eyeball” average might suggest.

(2) The boost to DGR from reinvestment of dividends is exactly equal to the yield of the securities purchased with those dividends, allowing the investor a high degree of control over this aspect."

[…] Pregunta

"Could you please expand on the following? It seems like if “A” is true than perhaps “B” can’t be true?

A.)"Higher-yield securities weight more heavily in “organic” dividend growth than lower-yield securities, leading to a lower portfolio DGR than an “eyeball” average might suggest."

B.) “Thus selective reinvestment of dividends into the higher-yield securities can generate greater DGR than the yield of the portfolio might suggest.”


"“A” refers to “organic” dividend growth, the result of company dividend increases. It averages over a portfolio weighted by the dividend income of the position, and thus high-yield positions factor in much more heavily. The dividend growth of NKE doesn’t move the needle in my portfolio, despite being one of my six largest positions and an excellent dividend grower.

“B” refers to the dividend growth generated by reinvestment of dividends. The added percentage from this aspect is exactly equal to the yield of the purchases securities, regardless of the source of the dividends.

Thus somebody who owns a slow-growth 6% yielder and uses those proceeds to purchase low-yield growth stocks is hammering their dividend growth on both fronts. Which is fine, of course, if that is what their strategy calls for."


No estoy hoy para traducir del ingles, pero lo que yo entiendo, que es lo que hago, es ponderar el incremento de dividendo con lo que pesa esa accion en mi cartera.

Es decir, una accion que incremente el dividendo un 20% pero que solo pondera un 0,8% en mi cartera tendra poca influencia en el DGR total de la cartera

Sin haber leído el texto más que en diagonal, entiendo que no es eso lo que dice, sino ponderar el DGR por el peso de los dividendos de cada acción al total de dividendos de la cartera (proporcional a yield posición * peso posición)


Es lo que dice @jgr23

En mi hilo lo aclaré (creo) un poco más.
Miguel Ángel, la cosa también está muy relacionada con el yield de la empresa en cuestión. Pero lo que viene a decir es que las empresas de bajo yield, aunque tengan un aumento muy importante en crecimiento de dividendos, tendrán poco efecto en el DGR global de tu cartera A MENOS que tengas un porrón de esas acciones (incluso llega a decir un 50% del peso).
La media aritmética del yield es la real, pero la del DGR tiende a ser mucho más baja de lo que pensamos.
Reinvirtiendo en empresas con yield alto o vendiendo revalorizaciones de las growth para comprar dividendos (como tú haces) logras aumentar en mayor medida el % de dividendos.


Yo me referia al calculo de la DGR total de la cartera, tal como lo hacia yo, como decia, no me lo he leido.

No se como lo haceis por aqui pero para el calculo yo considero la ponderacion de la posicion. No se si estara bien hecho pero me da un dato de DGR, eso si, bastante bajito.

La forma que comentas @jgr23 pues la verdad es que no se cual sera la mejor o la mas correcta, no tengo ni idea, lo que si tengo claro es que por ponderacion de dividendos frente a dividendos totales a mi me penaliza el crecimiento, creo, ya que las mayores ponderaciones de dividendos se me dan en empresas con alto yield y bajo o nulo crecimiento.

Quizas un dia de estos la calcule de la otra forma para comparar.

1 Like

Por poner un ejemplo simple para que se vea la diferencia:

Cartera de 1000€

  • 50%: Altria, Yield 10%, DGR 2%
  • 50%: Visa, Yield 1%, DGR 20%

Dividendos año 1: 55€ (50+5)
Dividendos año 2: 57€ (51+6)

DGR Ponderado por peso de la posición: 11%
DGR Ponderado por peso de los dividendos: ~3.6%

La segunda opción es la que te dice lo que han crecido orgánicamente los dividendos de tu cartera. Si usas la media aritmética de DGR los dividendos en el año 2 serían 61.05€, que no se ajusta a la realidad. Depende lo que quieras medir puede tener más sentido usar una ponderación u otra.


Sencillo y perfecto el ejemplo

Gracias @jgr23


Ejemplo clarito y sencillo

Yo utilizo esta ponderación para el seguimiento de mi cartera.