Sí. Menos mal que Vash me ha corregido. Tu interpretación era correcta.
El moat no tiene nada que ver con el precio, pero el precio sí tiene que ver para estar o no incluida en el Morningstar Wide Moat Focus Index.
Ups, no había actualizado y veo que ya estaba contestado, disculpas.
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Añadidas 5 ADS a $103
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Es todo un señor cuchillo cayendo…
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Creo que el mercado sobrerreacciona…
Al final he comprado las dos: SPG (45%) y TCO (55%). Ahora toca esperar e ir cobrando dividendos que espero que sean crecientes como suelen serlo en estas empresas.
Un saludo.
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¿Quizá Markel?
15.000 millones de capitalizacion vs 500.000 de Berkshire. Aun les queda por replicar 
Por cierto que para M* Markel no tiene moat
We Think Expecting Markel to Replicate Berkshire Hathaway’s Historical Performance is Unrealistic
Markel has built a reputation as a “mini-Berkshire,” and while we think it has developed a solid franchise, we believe the premium the market awards the company based on this narrative is not fully justified.
At first glance, Markel would appear to have the making of a moaty business, as it focuses on specialty lines. The company has substantial excess and surplus lines operations, but it also focuses on niche underwriting areas such as insuring summer camps, childcare centers, and livestock. We think the most common path to a moat for commercial property and casualty insurers is to focus on niche lines such as these. However, underwriting results have fallen a bit short of the strongest players in the industry, largely because of a relatively high expense ratio.
We think the primary reason Markel draws interest is how it differentiates itself in terms of capital allocation. Most insurers actively return the bulk of their free cash flow, but Markel retains the vast majority of its capital; its goal is to compound this capital at high rates of return over a long period. However, this is much easier said than done, and we think expecting Markel to replicate Berkshire Hathaway’s historical performance is unrealistic. While Tom Gayner has a good investing track record, the company’s M&A efforts look like a mixed bag to us, and we see its equity-heavy investing approach as more risk-tolerant than value-creative.
Admittedly, the company has had a strong run in the post-crisis environment, with book value per share growing at a 11% CAGR from 2012 to 2017. However, low interest rates, a bull equity market, and relatively benign catastrophe environment made for an essentially ideal backdrop given Markel’s strategy, and this growth rate was not sustainable. A spate of natural catastrophes in 2017 drove Markel to an underwriting loss, and further catastrophes and a bear equity market, along with some controversy at an acquired business, hampered 2018 results.
Markel will likely be a strong performer as long as equity markets continue to rise, but investors might rethink the high multiple the stock enjoys if the markets decline and book value growth slows.
In general, insurers do not benefit from favorable competitive positions. Industry competition is fierce, and the products are essentially commodities. Furthermore, most participants do not know their cost of goods sold for a number of years, allowing them to underprice policies without knowing it. Firms have a large incentive to chase growth without regard for profitability, a cycle that repeats itself as competitors are forced to match artificially low prices or risk losing business. That said, we do believe the space contains some moaty franchises.
While Markel has generated a reputation as a mini-Berkshire, we do not believe it benefits from a moat. In terms of underwriting, the company falls a bit short of the level we think is necessary to award a narrow moat. Markel does focus on specialty, noncommodified lines, and we believe focusing on specialty lines is the most common path to a moat for P&C insurers. Markel is the sixth-largest writer of excess and surplus lines in the United States. Outside of excess and surplus lines, the company operates in a number of areas that fit our definition of specialty lines, ranging from executive liability to commercial equine insurance. As a result, the company historically has produced very attractive loss ratios, averaging 63% over the past five years. However, its elevated expense ratio, which has averaged 36% over the past five years, has limited underwriting income over time. Expense ratios in specialty lines are typically higher than in other lines, but Markel’s expense ratios are high even relative to other specialty insurers. The company’s relative inefficiency on this score is one of the main obstacles to developing a moat, in our view.
Markel significantly expanded its presence in reinsurance through the purchase of Alterra in 2013, and reinsurance now accounts for a little over 20% of premiums. In our view, this move was a further obstacle to developing a moat. We think moats are very hard to come by in reinsurance, and this area is significantly more volatile than Markel’s historical operations.
We believe the company’s perceived ability to generate alpha on the investment side is the primary attraction for many investors. CIO Tom Gayner has an impressive record, as he has beaten the S&P 500 by almost 2 percentage points on average over the past 10 years. We like his investing approach, as it closely mirrors our methodology. However, we think the company’s asset-allocation decisions (and the bull market) have been a much bigger factor in driving book value growth in recent years. We estimate that even if Gayner is able to replicate the alpha he has generated historically, this would add only about 1 percentage point to annual book value growth, suggesting his investment skill is not enough to significantly affect our view of the company’s prospects. Further, the company acquires noninsurance operations as part of its investment strategy. While Markel believes these companies can grow over time to justify the prices paid, at this point we think a skeptical view of potential value creation in this area is warranted.
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Gracias por la aclaración.
Se habló bastante de esta compañía en diciembre-enero cuando cayó de los 1000€ y por eso la conocía y pensaba era una BRK-like. Tras este texto de M*, veo que les queda camino por recorrer y demostrar cómo se comporta cuando acabe el mercado alcista.
Dos que se ponen con un YIELD del 4%
TAP
GIS
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Debut en Wall Street. Estamos presenciando los nuevos CCL, RCL?
Parece que R.B le ha tomado la delantera a J.B y E.M…
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Suspendida la cotización de JNJ. A ver qué ha pasado?
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Acabo de leerlo:
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Pueden ir por aquí los tiros?
https://seekingalpha.com/pr/17679021-15-new-tests-bottle-johnsons-baby-powder-previously-tested-fda-find-asbestos
También hablan de la entrada de Buffet, por rumores que no sea…
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Comunicado oficial JNJ:
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Y ahora es cuando nos preguntamos: ¿por qué no cargué el otro día a 127?
No hay manera
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Pues porque la esperamos a 120$ 
Por lo menos yo sí que la espero a ese precio.
¡Esto es bolsa!
Saludos.
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Bueno, si es por el comunicado de que no hay amianto en el talco, me parece que no la han suspendido precisamente por miedo a que se desplome…
Ojalá me equivoque, pero me da que no la veremos a 100$ hasta el siguiente split.
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En postmarket sube 5$ hasta los 134$. Y yo que estaba esperando a primeros de mes para estrenarme con JNJ 
. Habrá que esperar…
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