We sold our holding in Starbucks during the month. The top 5 contributors in the month were Waters, Philip Morris, Kone, Adobe and Mettler-Toledo. The top 5 detractors were Amazon, IDEXX, Microsoft, McCormick and Estée Lauder.
Se veía venir después de que la vendieran en el fondo sostenible en Abril
Vienen cambios para la compañía, tal vez a Terry no le gusta lo que pueda venir
Starbucks’ longtime CEO is back again. This time, things are different
Howard Schultz says Starbucks must transform
In a statement the day his return was announced, Schultz said he had not planned to return to Starbucks but knows the company is at a point where it must transform once again.
“Our success is not an entitlement,” he said. “We must continue to earn the trust of our people and our customers every day.”
La correlación con el SP500 es cada vez mayor. Y el solape con las carteras de muchos inversores (indexados o inversión directa en acciones) debe ser también cada vez más alta.
Hasta principios de abril’20 no recuperó los 70$. Tiene razón que, si construyeron toda la posición en marzo (desconozco si han dado tanto detalle) seguramente han salido en positivo, aunque haya sido un número bajo anualizado.
De todas formas, para una acción en la que entraron en un momento extraordinario, por su calidad y pensando en do nothing, salir dos años después casi a la par no lo veo un éxito precisamente. En primer lugar porque parece extraño que, lo que sea que hayan visto, no estuviera visible ahí antes, pudiendo salir a precios más altos los últimos meses. Y en segundo lugar porque en el momento de la compra había muchas empresas de alta calidad disponibles a derribo, por lo que el coste de oportunidad en dos años ha sido significativo.
I have also learnt that selling a stake in a good company is almost always a mistake
Take Sigma-Aldrich, a US chemical company based in St Louis. It supplies pots of chemicals to scientists around the world who use them in tests and experiments. Its financial performance fitted our criteria, as did its operational characteristics — supplying 170,000 products to more than a million customers at an average price of $400 per product. It fitted our mantra of making its money from a large number of everyday repeat transactions, as well as having a base of loyal scientists who relied on its service. It was a predictable company of exactly the type we seek. That was until it was revealed that it was trying to acquire Life Technologies, a much larger company which supplies lab equipment. Given the execution risk involved, we sold our stake. As it happens, Sigma-Aldrich did not acquire Life Technologies as it was outbid. But having gone public on its willingness to combine with another business, it was in no position to defend its independence and succumbed to a bid itself from Merck at a price about 40 per cent above the price we had sold at.
Selling good companies is rarely a good move. The good news is that we don’t do it very often.
An illustration of the problems of low gross margins was recently supplied by the US retailer Target — a stock we would never own — in its first quarter results.
Meta’s stock now trades on a FCF yield of 8.7%. At this level it is either cheap or a so-called value trap. We will let you know which when we find out, but we are inclined to believe it is the former
Y luego reparte al “Balue” investing en cada parrafo en que se acuerda